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WHY THE ASSERTION OF A “NATIONALIST” PRESIDENCY DOES 
NOT SUPPORT CLAIMS FOR EXPANSIVE PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
William P. Marshall* 
The central premise of the theory of the nationalist presidency is 
that the President is the “true representative of the American peo-
ple.”1  The Congress, in contrast, is parochial because its members 
have narrow, geographically bound constituencies that may not re-
flect the broader concerns of the nation as a whole.2  Thus, the na-
tionalist presidency theorists contend, it is more consistent with de-
mocratic ideals to invest power in the nationalist presidency rather 
than in the parochial Congress.  The presidency, they argue, is the 
more democratic branch. 
Proponents of the vision of the nationalist presidency point to two 
key factors in support of their thesis.  The first is structural.  The Pres-
ident is the only political official elected nationally under the Consti-
tution.3  He is therefore the only elected officeholder who must re-
spond to a national, as opposed to a local, constituency.  Accordingly, 
he should be expected to represent and be accountable to national 
rather than parochial interests. 
The second factor pertains to the public’s expectations surround-
ing the presidency.  The common, if not universal, perception in the 
current political climate is that the presidency, far more than the 
Congress, is the key institution in advancing the nation’s agenda and 
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 1 Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
1217, 1219 (2006). 
 2 The nationalist presidency assertion is similar to the notion of the so-called unitary execu-
tive in that it is, at its essence, an argument for concentrating power in the presidency.  
But its premises are substantially different.  The theory of the unitary executive posits that 
the Constitution vests all executive power in the executive branch; therefore any incur-
sions by the other branches into the realm of executive power are unconstitutional.  See 
STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:  PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 3 (2008) (explaining the unitary executive theory).  
The nationalist presidency claim, on the other hand, is based upon more general claims 
of democratic legitimacy:  power is appropriately vested in the presidency because of the 
President’s unique relationship to the national electorate. 
 3 The Vice President is also elected nationally, but he is not elected independently of the 
President. 
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that the presidential election is far more important in setting the na-
tion’s direction than are Congressional races.4 
Voter and media behavior bear this out.  Voters have far greater 
interest in presidential elections than down-ballot races, voter turn-
out is far greater in presidential elections than in off-year elections, 
and voters invest far greater expectations in the results of presidential 
races than other political choices.5  The media, in turn, reflects 
(and/or catalyzes) the public’s interest.  Intense media focus on pres-
idential elections usually begins at least two years before the actual 
event;6 and the dominance of the coverage of the presidential race 
over all other political contests becomes even more overwhelming 
once the formal presidential selection process gets underway in the 
state caucuses and primaries—events that now start close to a year be-
fore the presidential election itself.7  Thus, the presidential election 
has been characterized by some as, in effect, a national plebiscite on 
the direction of the country.8 
The thrust of the nationalist presidency assertion, however, is not 
limited to observations regarding constitutional structure and public 
expectations.  Rather, the import of this vision is also in its normative 
implications for the debate over the breadth and the limitations of 
presidential power.  This is because, if true, a vision of a nationalist 
 
 4 See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, The President:  Lightning Rod or King?, 115 YALE 
L.J. 2611, 2613 (2006) (“Electing the President is the democratic decision that really 
counts.”). 
 5 See Larry J. Sabato, Who Votes?  The Key Question for the 2006 Midterms, SABATO’S CRYSTAL 
BALL, Apr. 28, 2006, http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/article.php?id= 
LJS2006042801 (analyzing consistently lower voter turnout in midterm elections than in 
presidential races). 
 6 This point may well be understated.  In fact, the media begins to apply significant cover-
age to the next presidential race often before the last ballots in the previous election are 
fully counted.  See, e.g., Jonathan Martin, GOP Gears up for 2012, POLITICO, Nov. 9, 2008, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1108/15451.html (describing discusions of the 
Republican field of candidates for the 2012 presidential election even as votes are “being 
counted in some races in last Tuesday’s election”). 
 7 The 2008 election season, for example, formally began on January 3, 2008 with the Iowa 
caucuses.  See, e.g., FRANK NEWPORT ET AL., WINNING THE WHITE HOUSE 2008:  THE 
GALLUP POLL, PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE PRESIDENCY 271 (2009) (“In the early part of 
January [2008], Iowa and New Hampshire voters cast the first official votes of the 2008 
presidential election.”). 
 8 As Matthew Adler explains, the notion of a plebiscite presidency is one that is directly 
responsive to the electorate and is therefore justified in broadly exercising control over 
the administrative state.  See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State:  
Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 875–76 (1997) (describing 
the “Plebiscitary President” who is responsive to the “judgments, preferences, beliefs or 
other attitudes” of the citizenry such that an argument could be made for “augmenting 
his control over administrative agencies”). 
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presidency is supported by two democratic ideals, representativeness 
and accountability.  The representativeness claim is that the President 
better reflects the national will than the Congress because he is 
elected by the entire nation.  The accountability claim is that because 
he is nationally elected, the President is more accountable to the 
people for his actions than is the Congress.  Based upon these values, 
then, the normative case purportedly follows.  If the President rather 
than the Congress is more accountable to the nation and better 
represents the national will, as the proponents of the nationalist pres-
idency suggest, then it ostensibly is more democratic to defer to the 
power of the presidency vis-à-vis the Congress in inter-branch dis-
putes.9  Thus, presidential power advocates have raised the vision of 
the nationalist presidency as an argument as to why more power 
should be centered in the executive rather than the legislative branch 
in a host of contested realms, including foreign policy,10 war powers,11 
and presidential control over the administrative state.12 
This Article addresses the central issues regarding the question of 
the nationalist presidency.  Part I discusses the structural argument.  
Does the fact that the President is elected nationwide mean that he 
 
 9 See Stephen Skowronek, Essay, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power:  A Devel-
opmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070, 2098 (2009) (describ-
ing the argument that “the selection of the President had become, in effect, the only 
credible expression of the public’s will”). 
 10 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (defer-
ence to the President in foreign policy is required because the nation “speaks with one 
voice” through the presidency to the rest of the world); Steven G. Calabresi, Some Norma-
tive Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 89 (1995) (describing balance of 
power between the President and Congress with respect to foreign policy); Eric A. Posner 
& Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1202 (2007) 
(arguing for increased deference to the executive in matters of foreign affairs based on 
the national accountability of the President and also for practical concerns); see also 
BARBARA HINCKLEY, THE SYMBOLIC PRESIDENCY:  HOW PRESIDENTS PORTRAY THEMSELVES 
145 (1990) (noting that the President must “go outside the constitution” and act as for-
eign policymaker in order to meet public expectations regarding his role in foreign pol-
icy matters); CRAIG A. RIMMERMAN, PRESIDENCY BY PLEBISCITE:  THE REAGAN-BUSH ERA IN 
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 115–17 (1993) (describing how recent administrations have 
overstepped their constitutional authority and expanded their powers in foreign affairs in 
order to meet plebiscitary expectations). 
 11 See Calabresi, supra note 10, at 38 (“Energy in the executive is defended here as being 
essential for both foreign policy reasons and to protect the polity as a whole from factional 
strife.”). 
 12 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2248 (2001) (noting 
“the regulatory activity of the executive branch agencies [is] more and more an extension 
of the President’s own policy and political agenda”); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, 
The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1994) (describing the strong 
version of the unitary executive theory in which “the President has plenary or unlimited 
power over the execution of administrative functions”). 
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will more likely reflect, and be more accountable to, the views of the 
nation as a whole as opposed to a Congress whose members are 
elected in states or districts that are geographically limited?  The Part 
concludes that the structural case in favor of the vision of the nation-
alist President is not persuasive because other structural aspects of 
the constitutional, winner take all elections, the role of the Electoral 
College, and term limits serve to limit both the presidency’s represen-
tativeness and its accountability.  Part II examines the case in favor of 
the nationalist presidency stemming from the public expectations 
surrounding the presidency.  The Part suggests that the argument is 
descriptively accurate; citizens do consider the presidency and presi-
dential elections to be uniquely significant in carrying out and setting 
the nation’s agenda.  The Part then goes on to question, however, 
whether this political reality should be deemed to have any constitu-
tional or normative consequence.  The Part concludes that it does 
not.  Part III addresses a further assertion offered by the proponents 
of the nationalist presidency vision—that the public expectations 
placed on the office serve to weaken the presidency because the pres-
ident does not have the capacity to meet those expectations.  Accord-
ingly, these proponents contend, the presidency should be empow-
ered to meet those expectations.  The Part suggests, however, that 
this argument is not persuasive because the assertion that power 
should be expanded to meet expectations is virtually boundless and 
that, in any event, the breadth of presidential power should be meas-
ured in its relation to congressional power and not to public expecta-
tions.  The Part concludes that because of the current imbalance of 
power between the Congress and the presidency, any further accre-
tion of presidential authority is not warranted. 
I.  THE STRUCTURAL CASE FOR THE NATIONALIST PRESIDENCY 
The case from constitutional structure supporting the vision of 
the nationalist presidency is straightforward.  Because the President is 
the only nationally elected officer under the Constitution, he is uni-
quely beholden to a national constituency.  Members of Congress, on 
the other hand, are presumed to be more motivated by regional con-
cerns because they are elected from states and congressional dis-
tricts.13  The President, therefore, is ostensibly both more representa-
tive of, and accountable to, the interests of the nation as a whole.   
 
 13 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948 (1983) (“[I]t may be . . . that the President elected 
by all the people is rather more representative of them all than are the members of either 
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The structural argument, however, is not as clear-cut as it might 
originally appear.  Consider first the claim that the President is more 
representative of the popular will than the Congress.  As Jide Nzelibe 
points out in his superb article, The Fable of the Nationalist President and 
the Parochial Congress,14 there is a critical conceptual flaw in this struc-
tural claim that the President better represents the national will than 
members of Congress because he is elected nationally and they are 
elected only regionally.  It compares the President to individual 
members of Congress and not to the institution of Congress as a 
whole.  But while members of Congress may have specific incentives 
to “cater to the narrow needs of their constituencies,” this does not 
necessarily mean that “the collective preferences of Congress will also 
be parochial.”15  The question, in short, is not whether the President 
is more nationalist (or less parochial) than any individual member of 
Congress,16 the question is whether the presidency is more nationalist 
than the institution of Congress as a whole.  The answer to this ques-
tion, in turn, is far less clear. 
To begin with, the vision of the nationalist presidency as the most 
representative institution is inconsistent with the Framers’ concept of 
which branch was designed to most directly reflect the will of the 
people.  To the Framers, that body was intended to be the House of 
Representatives.17  That is why its elections were set for every two 
years.18  Thus, even if deference to which elected branch was most re-
 
body of the Legislature whose constituencies are local and not countrywide . . . .” (quot-
ing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 123 (1926))). 
 14 Nzelibe, supra note 1. 
 15 Id. at 1221. 
 16 In fact, members of Congress may not be as purely motivated by regional concerns as na-
tionalist presidency advocates seem to suggest.  See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 
514 U.S. 779, 803 (1995) (“In [the] National Government, representatives owe primary 
allegiance not to the people of a State, but to the people of the Nation.”).  Moreover, 
even members who are not motivated by the lofty goals ascribed to them in Thornton are 
still likely, because of campaign finance concerns, to be as influenced by national issues as 
much as local.  Much of the money flowing into federal races come from ideological 
sources that transcend state or district boundaries and members of Congress may find 
themselves equally, if not more obligated, to respond to these contributors’ concerns 
than to the parochial concerns of the actual voters in their district. 
 17 See CHARLES B. CUSHMAN JR., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S. CONGRESS 36 (2006) (“In 
the case of the House, the Framers built a chamber that focused on the representative 
role—they wanted to ensure that the people’s voice was heard in the national govern-
ment.”). 
 18 See id. (“[B]y requiring frequent elections of the whole membership of the House, the 
Founders thought they could guarantee that the members of the House would stay very 
close to the people who chose them.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 327 (James Madison) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining the purpose of frequent elections as a mecha-
nism for the House of Representatives to reflect the will of the people); JOHN R. VILE, 1 
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sponsive to immediate popular will were considered relevant to the 
allocation of power between the branches, a matter to be discussed 
below,19 an originalist interpretation stemming from constitutional 
structure would center that power in the House and not the presi-
dency. 
Even beyond originalist understandings, however, the representa-
tiveness claim in favor of the nationalist presidency is not as direct as 
its proponents might suggest.20  For example, the winner take all sys-
tem of presidential elections set up by the Constitution undercuts the 
claim because it lessens the extent that the President needs to be rep-
resentative of the nation as a whole rather than of his own political 
majority or plurality.  Regardless of how close the presidential elec-
tion, the elected President assumes full control over the executive 
branch and can exclude all other political voices from his administra-
tion if he so chooses.  Not so for the Congress.  Congress has mem-
bers that represent national political minorities as well as political ma-
jorities and therefore its deliberations necessarily reflect wider 
perspectives than an executive branch of government comprised of 
one party alone.  For that reason, its decisions may reflect a broader 
national consensus than that of the presidency.21 
The structural claim in favor of representativeness is also weak-
ened by the role of the Electoral College.  The President is not 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787:  A COMPREHENSIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
AMERICA’S FOUNDING 146 (2005) (“Presidents serve for four-year terms, senators for six-
year terms, and members of the federal judiciary ‘during good behavior,’ or for life.  The 
term of the House is thus the shortest of any official specified in the Constitution.  This 
short term indicates the delegates’ desire to keep the members of the body ‘close to the 
people.’”); see also 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 360–62 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911) (publishing the transcription of the delegates’ discussion at the con-
vention before they voted on a two-year term length for the House). 
 19 See infra note 32, notes 50–58 and accompanying text. 
 20 This is not to say that the House has lived up to its role as being the institution that is 
most representative of popular will.  As has been well documented, the House has been 
particularly subject to capture by special interests.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest 
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 48–49 (1985) (describing the contin-
uum of representative roles in Congress including the pressures of constituents and the 
influence of special interest groups).  The fact that so many House seats have been made 
‘safe’ by redistricting has also arguably undercut that institution’s responsiveness to popu-
lar will. 
 21 As Professor Nzelibe has explained: 
Far from presuming that the president would be a plebiscitary figure that embod-
ied majoritarian preferences, the framers implemented the opposite presump-
tion—the national interest would be achieved by the institutional clashing of in-
terests.  Indeed, to the extent that the framers compared the features of the 
political branches at all, they appeared to assume that Congress would be more 
accountable to the people than the president. 
  Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 1219–20 (footnotes omitted). 
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elected by a national vote.  He is elected by an Electoral College de-
fined by state boundaries,22 a process which necessarily injects region-
alism and parochialism into presidential politics.  This means not 
only that presidential campaigns and their messages are skewed to 
voters in battleground states23 but, as Nzelibe documents, that presi-
dential policies are often geared to currying favor with voters in those 
states regardless of whether such policies reflect the interests of the 
nation as a whole.24  Because states like Ohio and Florida, for exam-
ple, often serve as Electoral College tipping points,25 Presidents often 
cater their policies to respond to the specific concerns of citizens of 
those states.26  Non-contested states, on the other hand, may see their 
particular concerns diminished.  The reality of the Electoral College, 
in short, makes the claim that the President is uniquely representative 
of the country as a whole significantly overstated. 
Additionally, the length of the four-year presidential term also 
weakens the structural claim of representativeness because it sets 
forth too great a lag time to fairly suggest that a President still reflects 
the popular will that many years into his term.  Popular opinion is far 
too mercurial and, in any case, is often overtaken by intervening 
events for an election taken years earlier to accurately reflect popular 
opinion on any given issue.27  In fact, a dramatic loss of public sup-
port for a President’s policies quite often takes only months rather 
than years to be realized.  Already, as of this writing, for example, 
there has been a sharp decline in support for President Barack Ob-
ama’s policies even though the current administration is still less than 
 
 22 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; id. amend. XII. 
 23 See Dan Balz & Jim VandeHei, Candidates Narrow Focus to 18 States:  Battle Has Begun in 
Most-Contested Areas of Nation, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2004, at A1 (discussing the number of 
electoral votes and past election results as decisive motivation for candidates to focus 
their campaigns on battleground states like Ohio, Florida, and others in the 2004 presi-
dential race). 
 24 Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 1240–42 (documenting several instances in which candidates 
cater to swing voters). 
 25 See Balz & VandeHei, supra note 23; see also PAUL R. ABRAMSON ET AL., CHANGE AND 
CONTINUITY IN THE 2004 ELECTIONS 36, 45 (2006) (listing swing states with a high number 
of electoral votes at stake as the focus of the 2004 presidential campaign, including fifty-
three visits by the candidates to Ohio). 
 26 See Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 1240 (“President [George W.] Bush also increased steel tariffs 
before the 2004 presidential election, a move that would ostensibly benefit steel interests 
in swing states like Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia at the expense of steel consum-
ers in the rest of the country.”). 
 27 For a study explaining how events account for changes in popular opinion during a Pres-
ident’s term of office, see Samuel Kernell, Explaining Presidential Popularity:  How Ad Hoc 
Theorizing, Misplaced Emphasis, and Insufficient Care in Measuring One’s Variables Refuted 
Common Sense and Led Conventional Wisdom Down the Path of Anomalies, 72 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 506 (1978). 
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a year old.28  That assertion that a President can lay claim that he ac-
curately represents the current will of the people cannot be sustained 
simply on the basis that he was the President most recently elected. 
In fact, even on the day of the election, the representativeness 
claim may be overstated with respect to the President’s position on 
any specific issue.  This is because voters cannot differentiate between 
issues in a presidential election but must instead vote for a single 
candidate who may, or may not, reflect their views on a particular 
matter.29  President George W. Bush, for example, ran in 2004 on a 
platform that included Social Security privatization.30  But any claim 
that his winning the election meant that the majority of Americans 
supported this reform would be completely false.31  The suggestion 
that a presidential election reflects national support for all of the is-
sues in a President’s agenda is simply unwarranted. 
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, a true structural argu-
ment would find the question of which political body best repre-
sented the will of the majority of the people at any given moment 
largely irrelevant.  The Constitution was deliberately designed to insu-
late government action from the immediate pressures of popular will 
and not to allow popular will to be facilely implemented.32 
The claim that constitutional structure means that the President is 
uniquely accountable to the nation as a whole, in turn, like the repre-
sentativeness assertion, also has considerable weaknesses.  Certainly, 
the Framers’ design in having the House of Representatives be the 
 
 28 See, e.g., Lydia Saad, Obama Approval Slips Three Points in Past Week, GALLUP, July 28, 2009, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/121934/Obama-Approval-Slips-Three-Points-Past-
Week.aspx (noting the drop in President Obama’s job approval rating since the election). 
 29 See Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances:  The Case of 
Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 197–99 (1995) (noting that the Pres-
ident does not hold the majority view of Americans on every policy issue); see also Edward 
Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
2073, 2078–80 (2005) (questioning electoral accountability of the President given the 
tendency of voters to select a familiar personality based on certain characteristics or a few 
issues only). 
 30 Christine Dugas, Bush Renews Call for Privatization of Social Security, USA TODAY, Sept. 3, 
2004, at A5. 
 31 See Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority Disapproval for Bush on Social Security, GALLUP, Mar. 2, 2005, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/15097/Majority-Disapproval-Bush-Social-Security.aspx (not-
ing “a majority of Americans disapprove of the way [President Bush] is handling [Social 
Security]”); see also Adam Nagourney & Janet Elder, Bush Doesn’t Share Public’s Priorities, 
New Poll Indicates, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2005, at A1 (finding that a majority of Americans 
think Bush’s proposal to privatize Social Security is a bad idea). 
 32 E.g., PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE:  HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 7–8 (2009) (noting that the Constitution was structured to provide 
careful deliberation among various factions); Skowronek, supra note 9, at 2071 (“The 
American Constitution was designed to render political change slow and difficult . . . .”). 
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institution closest to the people suggests they also believed that the 
House would be the more accountable (as well as the more represen-
tative) institution.33  And Electoral College politics speaks to lack of 
national accountability as well as to lack of national representative-
ness.  Because swing states play the key roles in whether a President is 
re-elected, the President’s need for accountability to those states is 
considerably higher than his need to appease the voters of non-
battleground states. 
The structural accountability claim also suffers from an additional 
infirmity.  Because of the term limits imposed by the Twenty-Second 
Amendment,34 the accountability of the President is time-limited.  
During the second term, the President is under considerably less 
pressure to respond to the preferences of his constituency because he 
does not stand for re-election.35  And during the final few months of 
the administration, he has virtually no accountability at all.36  The 
members of Congress, in contrast, are continually accountable to the 
voters.37 
 
 33 See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
 34 U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. 
 35 See JAMES R. HEDTKE, LAME DUCK PRESIDENTS—MYTH OR REALITY 155 (2002) (“[Two-term 
limits] break[] the link between accountability and responsiveness by removing re-
eligibility.  Thus, a president in his or her second term of office is not directly account-
able to the electorate. . . . [and] is not responsive to the demands of the people.”).  But see 
Thomas E. Cronin, Presidential Term, Tenure and Reeligibility, in INVENTING THE AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY 61, 84 (Thomas E. Cronin ed., 1989) (arguing that a President does not nec-
essarily become unaccountable once he enters a second term). 
 36 See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION:  WHERE THE CONSTITUTION 
GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 98–101, 156 (2006) (discuss-
ing the problem of the lack of political accountability of the President during periods of 
presidential transitions); Nancy Amoury Combs, Carter, Reagan, and Khomeini:  Presidential 
Transitions and International Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 303, 330 (2001) (“[V]oters and schol-
ars . . . view the actions of a lame duck as being not entirely legitimate democratically.  By 
electing his opponent, the voters can be understood to have repudiated the outgoing 
President and his agenda.  Thus, the outgoing administration can no longer be said to 
represent the will of the people.” (footnote omitted)).  For a contrast of the accountabil-
ity of incoming and outgoing presidents during the transition between administrations, 
see Nina A. Mendelson, Quick off the Mark?  In Favor of Empowering the President-Elect, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 464 (2009); cf. Jack M. Beermann & William P. Marshall, The Constitutional 
Law of Presidential Transitions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1254, 1265 (2006) (noting the dimin-
ished political power of an outgoing president during the transition period). 
 37 See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (striking down state-imposed 
term limitations on members of Congress).  To be sure, any accountability for House 
members may be seriously undermined by the creation of safe seats through legislative 
redistricting.  See Jane S. Schacter, Digitally Democratizing Congress?  Technology and Political 
Accountability, 89 B.U. L. REV. 641, 646 (2009) (“This sort of political homogeneity in con-
gressional districts works against the idea that robust accountability will be de-
manded . . . . Even in the 2008 election, only fifty of 435 House seats were decided by 
fewer than ten percentage points, and that number is itself higher than the average in 
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Finally, although fostering political accountability may be a consti-
tutional value,38 it does not inevitably trump other constitutional con-
cerns such as the fostering of checks and balances and the promotion 
of inter-branch deliberations.39  Thus, as will be further discussed in 
the next section, even if one accepts the nationalist presidency pro-
ponents’ assumptions that the presidency is uniquely accountable to 
the voters, it does not follow that the office is thereby entitled to par-
ticular deference in its disputes with Congress. 
II.  THE PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS CASE IN FAVOR OF THE NATIONALIST 
PRESIDENCY 
Perhaps the better argument in favor of the nationalist presidency 
is that, as a practical matter, the voters and the nation view the presi-
dential election as the key to setting national policy.  As Steven Cala-
bresi and James Lindgren note: 
Every four years Americans focus intently for ten months on the na-
tion’s presidential race.  That race formally begins in late January with 
the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary, and it continues 
nonstop until November with a torrent of primaries, nominating conven-
tions, presidential and vice presidential debates, and opinion polls.  The 
unmistakable message sent to the voters is that this is it:  The selection of 
a new President will determine which direction we go in as a society for 
the next four years.  Electing the President is the democratic decision 
that really counts.40 
Calabresi and Lindgren’s observations are descriptively accurate.41  
The race for the presidency captures the national imagination in a 
way that no other political election even comes close. 
 
most recent elections.  The profusion of safe seats is also driven by a set of familiar in-
cumbent advantages that further sabotage accountability, such as fundraising advantages, 
seniority, and the ability of incumbents to dole out pork and do casework.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 38 See HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 4–5 (2005) (discussing the President’s ac-
countability under the constitution).  As Krent notes, however, the President’s account-
ability extends to Congress as well as to the citizenry.  Id. 
 39 See SHANE, supra note 32, at 181 (“The Framers, recognizing the bewildering diversity of 
interests among the people, eschewed any reliance on the fiction that public sentiment 
embodied in a single plebiscite could capture the public interest.  They instead config-
ured the government’s principal institutions to reflect different constituencies, whose 
representatives would be engaged in a complex ongoing dialogue to determine where the 
public interest lay.”). 
 40 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 4, at 2613. 
 41 Calabresi and Lindgren are certainly correct that voter turnout is considerably and con-
sistently higher in presidential than in off-year elections.  For example, voter turnout in 
2008 and 2004 was considerably higher than in the off-year elections (2002 and 2006) 
preceding those elections.  See The United States Elections Project, Voter Turnout, 
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That said, however, it is not so clear that popular interest auto-
matically equates to representativeness and accountability.  Indeed, 
many of the factors noted in the previous Parts that demonstrate the 
flaws in the structural theory of the nationalist presidency also under-
cut the factual claim that the President is uniquely representative and 
accountable.  The Electoral College skews the extent the President is 
representative of, and accountable to, the nation as a whole as an ac-
tual as well as a theoretical matter.42  The four-year lag time between 
elections raises considerable question as to how representative a Pres-
ident truly is nearing the end of his term43 and presidential term lim-
its undercut the claim of accountability.44  The winner take all elec-
tion minimizes the extent the President needs to reach beyond his 
political base,45 and the nature of presidential elections makes it un-
clear which specific issues in a President’s agenda actually enjoy pop-
ular support.46  Moreover, the reality of current presidential polices is 
that accountability is limited in one other important aspect as well:  
the lack of transparency in the executive branch.  The notion of a 
highly accountable presidency makes sense only if there is sufficient 
transparency in the executive branch for the voters to be able to call 
the President to account.47  But as recent history suggests, it has been 
far too easy for the President to avoid that accountability.48 
 
http://elections.gmu.edu/voter_turnout.htm (relying on statistics compiled for research 
by Professor Michael McDonald at George Mason University).  More detailed reports 
from the U.S. Census Bureau also indicate far greater turnout in presidential elections 
than off-year elections since 1966.  See U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration Data, 
available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/voting.html (containing 
voting and registration data from the elections between 1964 and 2008). 
 42 See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text. 
 43 See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
 44 See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 45 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 46 See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
 47 For a discussion of the relationship between the unitary executive theory and presidential 
accountability, see Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741 
(2009). 
 48 See Kagan, supra note 12, at 2345–46 (noting that the check of political accountability on 
the president is not effective where the President “eschews transparency” through secre-
tive methods, citing the Reagan administration as one example); Kitrosser, supra note 47, 
at 1744 (“The Bush administration offers a powerful case study in the impact of unitary 
executive theory on information control and in the negative relationship between a uni-
tary executive and accountability.”); Elena Kagan, Dean, Harvard Law Sch., Remarks at 
the Yale Law Journal Symposium:  The Most Dangerous Branch?  Mayors, Governors, 
Presidents and the Rule of Law (Mar. 25, 2006); see also LEVINSON, supra note 36, at 79–81 
(describing unchecked and non-transparent “creeping presidential autocracy” under the 
most recent Bush administration); William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?  Governors, 
State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2475 
(2006) (noting how lack of transparency undercuts accountability). 
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Even if we assume, however, that popular interest in the presiden-
tial election translates into a unique representativeness and account-
ability in the office of the presidency, i.e., that the presidential elec-
tion has in fact become something akin to a plebiscite in which voters 
believe that they are setting the national agenda, there is significant 
question as to what normative or constitutional significance should 
be attached to that ostensible reality.49  The Constitution, after all, was 
not designed to have a plebiscite presidency,50 and even if the presi-
dency has, as a matter of public perception, evolved in that direction, 
there are sound reasons against integrating that concept into consti-
tutional law.51 
Nationalist presidency advocates, after all, advance their assertion 
for a reason.  As they see it, the existence of a nationalist presidency 
should be deemed to have normative consequences.  They contend, 
 
 49 The Court, apparently, has imbued the fact that the President is elected nationally with 
some normative significance in its requirement, set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), that courts must defer to administra-
tive agencies in statutory interpretation.  See Adler, supra note 8, at 877 (noting Chevron 
“clearly invokes the President’s majoritarian cast in justifying its doctrine of judicial def-
erence to agencies on matters of statutory interpretation”).  The Court reinforced this 
requirement this past term in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009), in 
which it held that such deference was required even when an agency changed positions 
to reflect the political agenda of a new administration. 
 50 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS:  JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, 
AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 44 (2005) (noting that the notion of the ple-
biscite presidency arose with the modern presidency); Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective 
Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30 (1993) (“No matter how closely the Presi-
dent approaches a ‘plebiscitary presidency’ as a matter of political reality, no such legal 
relationship is contemplated by the Constitution.”); Nzelibe, supra note 1, at 1219–20 
(“Far from presuming that the president would be a plebiscitary figure that embodied 
majoritarian preferences, the framers implemented the opposite presumption—the na-
tional interest would be achieved by the institutional clashing of interests.  Indeed, to the 
extent that the framers compared the features of the political branches at all, they ap-
peared to assume that Congress would be more accountable to the people than the pres-
ident.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 51 Justice Souter, for example, makes a particularly powerful argument as to why it is dan-
gerous to invest too much power in the presidency with respect to matters of national se-
curity: 
In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a reasonable de-
gree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or some condition in be-
tween) is not well entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose par-
ticular responsibility is to maintain security. For reasons of inescapable human 
nature, the branch of the Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the 
branch on which to rest the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the balance be-
tween the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory; the responsibility 
for security will naturally amplify the claim that security legitimately raises. 
  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring), quoted in Thomas 
P. Crocker, Overcoming Necessity:  Torture and the State of Constitutional Culture, 61 SMU L. 
REV. 221, 237 (2008). 
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for example, that a nationalist presidency supports greater control by 
the President over the administrative state on grounds that the Presi-
dent will use the administrative machinery to advance national as op-
posed to parochial concerns.52  Similarly, they suggest that the na-
tionalist vision means that the President should have more unilateral 
control over foreign policy and war matters because he enjoys a na-
tional mandate that the Congress does not.53 
Deferring to the presidency for these reasons, however, threatens 
other fundamental constitutional values.  First, the Framers were in-
terested in insulating the government from the immediate pressures 
of popular will.54  Thus, to the extent that the concept of the national-
ist presidency is designed to more readily allow for the implementa-
tion of popular will, it runs contrary to the Constitution’s overall 
structure.  As such, it creates the risk that the federal government will 
succumb to popular passions in a manner that the Constitution was 
deliberately designed to avoid.55 
Second, the Framers were concerned with creating a balance of 
power between the branches.56  Suggesting that any one branch 
should be especially empowered because it is purportedly uniquely 
democratic threatens this balance and creates the dangers of abuse, 
 
 52 See supra note 12; see also SHANE, supra note 32, at 158–66 (responding to the accountabil-
ity rationale for expanded presidential power over administrative agencies). 
 53 See supra notes 10–11.  But see CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 2, at 428–29 (conceding that 
there are limits on executive power in the area of foreign policy).  Notably, Calabresi and 
Yoo argue that although the President, as a unitary executive, should control foreign pol-
icy, the unilateral exercise of additional, implied powers in foreign affairs is unconstitu-
tional.  Using the most recent Bush administration as an example, they contrast Bush’s 
sweeping claims of power during the War on Terror with the more “modest” exercise by 
the Reagan administration.  Id. 
 54 See ERIC LANE & MICHAEL ORESKES, THE GENIUS OF AMERICA:  HOW THE CONSTITUTION 
SAVED OUR COUNTRY—AND WHY IT CAN AGAIN 15 (2007) (“America’s government is de-
signed to slow [a] response [to the demands of the its people], to resist, as Hamilton put 
it, ‘an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient 
impulse.’”). 
 55 See THOMAS E. CRONIN & MICHAEL A. GENOVESE, THE PARADOXES OF THE AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY 4–5 (2004) (“[I]f there was one thing the framers of the Constitution did not 
want, it was an overly powerful presidency. . . .  [The] early presidency, as envisaged by 
the founders, did not encourage a popularly elected leader who would seek to directly 
shape and respond to the public’s views.  On the contrary, popular leadership too 
grounded in the will of the people was viewed as a vice to be avoided.  The founders’ goal 
was to provide some distance between the public and national leaders, especially the pres-
ident, that distance to be used to refine the popular view, to allow for leadership and sta-
tesmanship rather than to do what the people wanted done.”). 
 56 See KRENT, supra note 38, at 2 (describing the background behind the “constitutional sys-
tem of separation of powers”). 
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misfeasance, and incompetence that come with unchecked power.57  
Third, as Peter Shane points out, the Framers were interested in 
adopting a constitutional structure that promoted inter-branch delib-
eration.58  Empowering a single branch to act without consultation 
eliminates this benefit. 
III.  PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS AND A WEAKENED PRESIDENCY? 
There is one other intriguing argument based upon the public 
perception of a nationalist presidency that merits special attention.  
The public perception of the breadth of presidential power, it is ar-
gued, leads to the expectations that the President has such power.  
Public expectations are then frustrated when the President does not 
have the power to meet those expectations.  As Steven Calabresi 
writes, “[o]ne of the biggest problems American democracy faces to-
day is that the presidency is too weak an office, constitutionally, to 
fulfill the expectations that voters have for it.”59  Thus, the suggestion 
is that the President needs to have more power in order to meet these 
expectations.60  Otherwise, presumably, the office is destined to fail.61 
There are, however, serious weaknesses in this position.  To begin 
with, the voters may be more sophisticated with respect to the expec-
tations regarding presidential elections than this account would al-
 
 57 The Framers expressly contemplated the threat of tyranny by an overly powerful branch 
of government.  In order “to control the abuses of government” and to prevent “a gradual 
concentration of the several powers in the same department,” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 
(James Madison), supra note 18, at 289–90, the Framers intended to distribute powers 
among three independent branches as “practical security . . . against the invasion of the 
others.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 18, at 276.  In this model, 
each branch is meant to perform its duties without an “overruling influence over the oth-
ers.”  Id. 
 58 SHANE, supra note 32, at 7. 
 59 Steven G. Calabresi, Book Review, “The Era of Big Government is Over”, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1015, 1040 (1998) (reviewing ALAN BRINKLEY ET AL., NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS:  ESSAYS IN 
DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1997)); see id. at 1040 n.141 (citing the proposition that 
“‘the expectations of the masses have grown faster than the capacity of presidential gov-
ernment to meet them.’” (quoting THEODORE J. LOWI, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT:  POWER 
INVESTED, PROMISE UNFULFILLED xii (1985))); see also RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS:  THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM 
ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN ix (The Free Press 1990) (1960) (arguing that the presidency is 
weak because of the contrast between what is expected of the office and its “assured ca-
pacity to carry through”). 
 60 Calabresi, supra note 59, at 1040. 
 61 For a powerful argument that centralizing presidential power may paradoxically weaken 
the presidency because the visibility of the office of the presidency makes it ill-equipped 
for effective conflict resolution, see Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern 
State:  Why a Unitary, Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 827 (1996). 
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low.  A significant segment of the electorate,62 after all, routinely sug-
gests that it favors divided government, indicating that voting behav-
ior may parallel constitutional structure in evidencing a wariness 
about a President’s agenda being enacted too quickly. 
More broadly, the failure of an office to meet the expectations 
surrounding it is not unique to the presidency.  As Derek Bok has 
written: 
Americans have expectations for politics and the political process that are 
often unrealistic.  Convinced that presidents can often accomplish more 
than is humanly possible, that legislators should be able to arrive at sen-
sible decisions without prolonged disagreement or controversy, and that 
politicians should refrain from pandering to the voters yet still reflect the 
views of their constituents, the public seems fated to endure repeated 
disappointment over the government and those who run it.63 
Conforming the power of an office to the expectations surrounding 
it, accordingly, would require a significant re-writing of all of gov-
ernment.  It could also lead to mutually inconsistent results.  For ex-
ample, the public may also have high expectations regarding the 
power of the Congress to achieve specific goals, but expanding con-
gressional power to meet such expectations would likely conflict with 
expanding presidential power to meet the expectations imposed 
upon that office. 
Second, the expectations argument is problematic in that it is po-
tentially boundless.  Public expectations about the scope of power 
arise in response to the uses and perceptions of that power.64  Conse-
quently, the more power that the President exercises or asserts, the 
more public expectations regarding the scope of his power will likely 
expand.65  The public expectations argument is then simply a road 
map for a continuous expansion of power.  Expectations lead to 
greater power which leads to greater expectations which lead to 
greater power which leads to greater expectations and so on. 
That presidential power is already difficult to confine only makes 
this constant expansion more likely.  The constitutional provisions 
governing the scope of presidential power are easily susceptible to 
expansive interpretation.  The key language in Article II setting forth 
 
 62 MORRIS FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 12–13, 64–65 (2d ed. 1996) (suggesting that vot-
ers in federal elections consciously or unconsciously split their votes along party lines). 
 63 DEREK BOK, THE TROUBLE WITH GOVERNMENT 383 (2001) (emphasis added), quoted in 
LANE & ORESKES, supra note 54, at 204. 
 64 See HINCKLEY, supra note 10, at 9–11 (discussing what the President means to Americans). 
 65 Id. 
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the limits of presidential power such as the Executive Power Clause66 
and the Take Care Clause67 are highly indeterminate, and the Presi-
dent also has been deemed to enjoy inherent, if undefined, powers.68  
This lack of precise contours on the scope of presidential power has 
inevitably led to its expansion, particularly in times of emergency 
when the presidency is often the only institution capable of immedi-
ately responding to the exigencies of the moment.69  The expansion, 
moreover, has not been limited to emergencies alone.  Presidential 
action creates precedents for similar actions by later administrations 
thus creating a historical dynamic in which the expansion of presi-
dential power becomes, in effect, a one-way ratchet continually add-
ing to a President’s already considerable arsenal of available powers.70  
Such a process does not need further reinforcement by an argument 
that presidential power should also expand to meet public expecta-
tions. 
Third and most fundamentally, the public expectations argument 
sets forth the wrong metric.  The relevant constitutional inquiry 
should be the scope of presidential power relative to the Congress, 
the balance that the Framers set forth in the Constitution, not the 
scope of presidential power relative to public expectations.  And with 
respect to that balance, the notion that we have a weakened presi-
dency is strikingly inaccurate.71 
 
 66 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America.”). 
 67 Id. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted . . . .”). 
 68 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (noting the President’s right to keep 
advice from subordinates confidential based on an executive privilege); Monaghan, supra 
note 50, at 11 (noting the power of the President to act in times of emergency). 
 69 For a discussion of the judiciary’s reluctance to limit the President’s power to respond to 
emergencies, see WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE:  CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
WARTIME (1998). 
 70 Cf. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 2 (tracing the history of Presidents’ assertions of a uni-
tary executive as precedential authority for the proposition that the unitary executive is 
constitutionally based). 
 71 See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1727–28 (1996) 
(discussing the growth of presidential power in relation to that of Congress); Abner S. 
Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 125 
(1994) (same); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers:  Checking Today’s Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316 (2006) (same); William P. Mar-
shall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. 
REV. 505, 507–18 (2008) (same).  To be sure, not all observers concede that the presi-
dency is unduly powerful.  See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s 
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE. L.J. 541, 550 (1994) (arguing that the President’s pow-
er over the administrative state is relatively weak); Fitts, supra note 61, at 838 (“[T]he 
modern presidency does not seem to be a particularly strong institution.”). 
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At the time of the Framing, it was thought that the legislative 
branch was the more powerful branch.72  That is why the Framers be-
lieved Congress needed to be divided into two branches.73  Any no-
tion, however, that Congress is twice as powerful as the executive is 
long since outdated.74  As Abner Greene has succinctly stated, “[n]ow, 
it is the President [instead of Congress] whose power has expanded 
and who therefore needs to be checked.”75 
In this respect consider Justice Jackson’s famous opinion from 
over fifty years ago in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer76: 
[I]t is relevant to note the gap that exists between the President’s paper 
powers and his real powers.  The Constitution does not disclose the 
measure of the actual controls wielded by the modern presidential office.  
That instrument must be understood as an Eighteenth-Century sketch of 
a government hoped for, not as a blueprint of the Government that is.  
Vast accretions of federal power, eroded from that reserved by the States, 
have magnified the scope of presidential activity. Subtle shifts take place 
in the centers of real power that do not show on the face of the Constitu-
tion. 
Executive power has the advantage of concentration in a single head 
in whose choice the whole Nation has a part, making him the focus of 
public hopes and expectations.  In drama, magnitude and finality his de-
cisions so far overshadow any others that almost alone he fills the public 
eye and ear.  No other personality in public life can begin to compete 
with him in access to the public mind through modern methods of 
communications.  By his prestige as head of state and his influence upon 
public opinion he exerts a leverage upon those who are supposed to 
check and balance his power which often cancels their effectiveness.77 
For numerous reasons, as I have written elsewhere,78 presidential 
power continues to dramatically expand at a rate not matched by the 
Congress.  Some of these reasons have already been noted above.79  
The fact that the constitutional definitions of presidential power are 
indeterminate, that each President’s exercise of power, no matter 
how expansive, becomes precedent for similar uses of power by sub-
 
 72 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 18, at (“In republican govern-
ment, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.”). 
 73 See id. (“The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different 
branches . . . .”). 
 74 Indeed, that vision may have been outdated as early as the Jefferson Administration.  See 
ACKERMAN, supra note 50, at 44 (noting the rise of strong presidentialism during the Jef-
ferson Administration); John Yoo, Jefferson and Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 421, 422 
(2008) (documenting President Jefferson’s expansive use of presidential power). 
 75 Greene, supra note 71, at 125. 
 76 343 U.S. 579, 653–54 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 77 Id. 
 78 See Marshall, supra note 71. 
 79 See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. 
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sequent administrations, and that the exigencies of the modern world 
inevitably invest power in the branch that is able to respond the fast-
est, all serve to expand presidential power.  Additionally, other factors 
such as the President’s power to control information, his unique abil-
ity to use media to set the national agenda, the role of executive 
branch lawyers as the final arbiters of separation of powers issues also 
lead to an increasingly powerful executive branch.80  And while I will 
not redevelop those arguments here, I should note one recent devel-
opment that hopefully proves my point about the existing imbalance.  
In November 2008, Rahm Emanuel, one of the most powerful mem-
bers of Congress, a potential future Speaker of the House, and a per-
son who was assured of literally lifetime election to the House from 
his safe Chicago district, resigned his post to become a White House 
staffer, a position with no independent constituency, no autonomy, 
no job security, and no tenure.81  And while the White House assign-
ment that he accepted was the immensely powerful position of Chief 
of Staff, his move to the White House demonstrates the locus of ac-
tual power in Washington in a way that no academic discussion can 
demonstrate.82 
The fact is that at this point in our history the political reality of 
contemporary Washington is that the setting of the national agenda 
begins and ends on the President’s desk.  Congress perhaps may have 
some ability from time to time to frustrate the President’s agenda, but 
the notion that the power of the presidency is ‘weak’ compared to the 
power of Congress is simply not sustainable. 
At this point, proponents of the vision of the nationalist presi-
dency might still respond that I have not addressed their central 
point—that if the President does not have the power to meet the 
public’s expectations, he is destined to fail and his presidency is 
weakened.  The short answer to this, of course, is that failure is a part 
of politics.  In 2006, for example, the voters elected a Congress in ma-
 
 80 See Marshall, supra note 71, at 509 (discussing factors that explain “why power has concen-
trated in the executive”). 
 81 See Jackie Calmes, Obama’s First Decision Has Capital Asking:  Politics as Usual, or Fresh Start?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at P5 (describing the significance of Emanuel’s move from a 
powerful post in the House to serve in the new administration); Carl Hulse, Candidates 
Emerge for Obama’s Inner Circle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at P5 (profiling Emanuel as a po-
tential member of the new administration). 
 82 To be sure, numerous members of Congress have left their posts to assume Cabinet posi-
tions, such as Senator Hillary Clinton, and Congressman Leon Panetta, who left his seat 
to become the head of the Office of Management and Budget.  However, Emanuel’s 
move to a White House staff position is particularly remarkable, precisely because of its 
lack of an independent portfolio and also because Emanuel was so well situated in a Con-
gressional leadership position. 
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jor part to extricate the United States from the war in Iraq.83  Yet, 
President George W. Bush was able to block Congress’s efforts in this 
regard even though the war was opposed by many in his own party.84  
The expectations argument, in short, could also lead to an argument 
in favor of expanding congressional power.  But I suspect that the 
proponents of the nationalist presidency would agree with me that 
the  failure of Congress to effectuate the popular will does not mean 
that congressional powers should be increased. 
More fundamentally, the fact that the President does not have un-
ilateral power to effectuate results does not mean that he will fail to 
achieve those results.  Rather, it means that he will need to work with 
the Congress or other relevant institutions to reach the desired out-
comes.  And that is precisely what a system of separation of powers 
requires. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The vision of the nationalist presidency is superficially appealing.  
The President is the only nationally elected officer and the public 
perceives the choice of the President to be the key event in the set-
ting of the national agenda.  It is therefore tempting to suggest on 
this basis that the President is uniquely representative of, and ac-
countable to, the people. 
In fact, however, the representativeness and accountability claims 
are overstated.  The Electoral College, the President’s four-year term, 
term limits, and a host of other factors serve to blur both the repre-
sentativeness and accountability lines.  More critically, the nationalist 
presidency claim ignores the constitutional design.  To begin with, it 
misses the fact that the body deemed by the Framers to be the most 
representative and accountable was the House, not the presidency.  
More fundamentally, however, the vision of the nationalist presidency 
rejects the basic separation of powers principle that the Constitution 
was not created to allow facile implementation of popular will.  Ra-
ther, it set forth a far more complicated matrix requiring deliberation 
and cooperation among the branches and not unilateral action by 
any one body.  In the end the vision of the nationalist principle is 
 
 83 See Adam Nagourney & Megan Thee, With Iraq Driving Election, Voters Want New Approach:  
Poll Finds Worrisome Indicators for G.O.P. With Control of Congress in Play, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 
2006, at A1 (noting that the “war has framed the midterm elections”). 
 84 See Harold J. Krent, From a Unitary to a Unilateral Presidency, 88 B.U. L. REV. 523, 523 (2008) 
(“[M]ore than any President in recent memory, [George W. Bush] has refused to use 
Congress as a partner in fashioning national policy.”). 
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nothing more than another argument for increasing presidential 
power.  Given the current imbalance of power between the presi-
dency and the Congress, however, it is an argument that the presi-
dency and the nation do not need. 
